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1016期 7月19日:Competitive Equilibrium Fraud in Markets for Credence Goods(Edi Karni, Johns Hopkins University)

时间:2019-07-16

【主题】 Competitive Equilibrium Fraud in Markets for Credence Goods

【报告人】Edi Karni, Johns Hopkins University

【时间】7月19日(星期五) 15:00-16:30

【地点】807

【语言】英文

【摘要】This is a study of the nature and prevalence of persistent fraud in competitive markets for credence-quality goods. We model the market as a stochastic game of incomplete information in which the players are customers and suppliers and analyze their equilibrium behavior. Customers characteristics, search cost and discount rate, are private information. Customers do not possess the expertise necessary to assess the service they need either ex ante or ex post. We show that there exists no fraud-free equilibrium in the markets for credence-quality goods and that fraud is a prevalent and persistent equilibrium phenomenon.

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